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CHARTER LITIGATION AND THE
POLICY PROCESSES OF
GOVERNMENT: A PUBLIC INTEREST
PERSPECTIVEO
By ELIZABETH J. SHILTON*
As a member of the private bar, I am not involved in
government. However, as a long-time member of the Women's Legal
Education and Action Fund's1 National Legal Committee and as a
litigator in Charter2 matters on behalf of LEAF and other equality-seeking
groups, I am directly involved in calling on government to respond to a
variety of Charter challenges. From that perspective, I have frequently
had occasion to reflect critically on the role of the Charter in the policy
processes of government.
LEAF was born officially on 17 April 1985, the day section 15 of
the Charter came into effect. Its role is to develop and implement a
coordinated national strategy for litigation designed to realize the*
Charter's promise of equality rights for women. It carries out that
mandate through its National Legal Committee, which selects test cases
for sponsorship and provides strategic direction for them. Test cases are
chosen for their precedent-setting value in developing an equality
jurisprudence of benefit to all Canadian women, including those whose
lives are shaped by multiple disadvantages. I have chaired the National
Legal Committee for a number of years and have observed very closely
the role of government in addressing the Charter issues and concerns of
© Copyright, 1992, Elizabeth J. Shilton.
* Partner, Cavalluzzo, Hayes & Shilton and current Co-Chair of the LEAF National Legal
Committee.
1 Hereinafter LEAF.
2 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter the Charter].
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equality-seeking groups, including LEAF. This paper does not represent
the "official" views of LEAF on these issues. The following is my own set
of considered reflections on government in its role as litigator of Charter
issues.
First, let me venture some observations on the role of Charter
litigation in the overall process of social change. The early debates
about whether or not Canada should have an entrenched Charter of
Rights and Freedoms focused to a significant extent on the legitimacy of
any species of judicial supremacy within our political tradition. Voices
from all points on the political spectrum made themselves heard in that
debate. Groups that advocated fundamental social change were perhaps
less concerned about the legitimacy question per se, than about the more
instrumental version of the same question, the efficacy question. In
other words, such groups were concerned about whether an entrenched
Charter would hasten social change or whether it would prove to be an
undesirable fetter on such change.
The Charter is obviously with us. No significant voice in the
current constitutional debate suggests that the Charter should be
repealed or that the fundamental relationships it establishes between
legislature and courts should be altered. The question for equality-
seeking groups, however, remains whether or not using the Charter is an
effective tool for social change. From this very practical perspective,
there persists a strong anti-Charter bloc, arguing: (1) that litigation itself
is a man's game, played by men's rules in which women's voices cannot
be heard; (2) that litigation is inefficient as a tool for social change
because it drains money, energies, and resources that could be better
deployed on other strategies; and (3) that litigation is reactionary
because it fosters the illusion that real change is possible within existing
social power relations and political structures.
All these arguments are worth listening to, and they must be
deeply pondered and carefully weighed by feminists who believe that
fundamental social change is a necessary precondition to the
achievement of a sex-equal society. For feminists to adopt litigation as
the only strategy for social change, or even as the main strategy, would
be, self-evidently, a strategic error. The fact that LEAF is an organization
dedicated to litigation should not mislead anyone into thinking that the
Canadian women's movement has opted for litigation over other
strategies for social change, or even that the particular feminists who
founded and have been involved in LEAF value litigation over other
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strategies. Litigation is simply one strategy among many. LEAF is often
referred to as "the litigation arm of the women's movement," but it is
not the sum total of the women's movement by any means. The
continually evolving, consultative, cooperative processes for case
development and case management, which LEAF pioneered, are an
important component o f LEAF'S recognition of the limitations of
litigation as a tool for equality-driven social change.
But even those who are not prepared to grant proactive litigation
an important role in social change recognize that the women's
movement cannot abjure the Charter. The Charter will not abjure us.
Many of the reforms and social programmes equality seekers have
achieved by using other strategies available in the political process have
been and are currently being challenged under the Charter. In many
recent Supreme Court of Canada Charter cases, we have witnessed an
historic clash between liberal individual rights models for Charter
interpretation, and more purposive, substantive models, which take
account of distinctive Canadian traditions of collective and
communitarian values. The women's movement cannot afford to let
these cases, many of them involving governmental initiatives crucial to
the status of disadvantaged groups, be decided without attempting to
ensure that the equality values at stake are fully recognized, and that the
impact of the developing jurisprudence on the interests of disadvantaged
groups is fully understood and taken into account in the decision-making
process. Thus LEAF, often in coalition with other groups, has intervened
in a number of cases in the Supreme Court of Canada. In some of these
cases sex equality was not directly in issue, but law of unparalleled
significance to women's equality rights was made.3
The development of Charter litigation has thus compelled
participation. In many Charter cases, as was anticipated in the early days
of the Charter, equality-seeking groups are the challengers of
governmental action. In such cases, these groups litigate to force
government to address directly the issues raised by the litigation, to
examine government policies, and to bring them into line with Charter
standards. In other cases, however, as was not so clearly anticipated,
equality-seeking groups are intervening on the side of government to
support equality-promoting legislative initiatives, which are under attack
3 Two important examples are Andrews v. The Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R.
143 and R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [hereinafter Keegstra].
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from other individuals or constituencies in the community. In these
latter cases, what equality seekers ask of government is that it mount a
proper defence, frame and put forward with conviction the right section
1 evidence and the right equality-based arguments in order to influence
the jurisprudence in a direction that will allow equality values to flourish.
How has government performed in Charter litigation affecting
equality rights? In June 1991 I attended a national symposium on
Women, Law and the Administration of Justice, hosted by The
Honourable Kim Campbell. The symposium was designed to grapple in
very practical ways with the problems facing women in the law and in the
legal system. While there was considerable criticism of the "by invitation
only" approach to community representation, the symposium was
attended by women representing a significant cross-section of Canadian
organizations dedicated to women's equality.
At that symposium, it was the consensus of equality-seeking
groups involved in litigation against the federal government that
government's record in dealing with Charter issues, which had entered
the court system, was disgraceful. There is little evidence that litigation
of this sort is ever seen as a trigger for policy review. There is no sense
of special governmental responsibility for fostering and promoting
Charter rights invoked through litigation. There is no discernible
attempt to spare the purses of public interest groups by making
voluntary disclosures, limiting discoveries, or consolidating issues. To
speak directly from LEAF's experience, the federal government's
litigation style is comparable to that of any long-pursed, cut-throat
corporation hoping to bankrupt the opposition before the case ever gets
to trial.
It has always been mysterious to those of us on the outside how
government sees the "instructions" process. Who "instructs" counsel?
Whence comes the policy direction that guides case management? From
an outsider's perspective, it often seems that the onlypolicy decision that
is ever made about some of these cases is whether to defend or not.
Once that decision is made, the file simply becomes part of a
government litigator's case-load, and the government litigation
juggernaut rolls into motion. Sometimes even the decision to defend
seems to be made at an administrative level rather than at a policy level.
There is little evidence that anybody ever pauses to reflect on the merits
of either the case or the political judgment involved in the decision to
defend.
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To a group like LEAF, which operates on the recognition that
even the smallest case management decision can have policy
implications, this seems like irresponsible "lawyering." It also seems
very much like a deliberate strategy to disempower equality-seeking
groups and maintain control of Charter policy review solely in the hands
of government.
There is great irony in all this. LEAF, like many other equality-
seeking groups, gets much of its funding for litigation from public
sources. Governments attracted favourable publicity in the early days of
the Charter by giving money to equality-seeking groups to sue the
government. Unfortunately, governments are slowly draining that
money away through litigation strategies designed to make sure it
doesn't go very far.4
The Ontario government, for example, established a million-
dollar litigation fund for the use of LEAF in Charter litigation. Estimating
conservatively, one major systematic case could cost that much, including
working with plaintiffs on both fact issues and legal theory, legal
research, commissioned fact and social science research, case
development, consultations with affected constituencies, discoveries,
motions, expert witness fees, and many long days of trial. LEAF has
several cases now on its roster that could reach that magnitude.
At the Justice Minister's conference, equality-seeking groups put
forward to Kim Campbell a specific challenge to review personally all
cases in which her department was involved in defending governmental
action against equality challenges, and to personally assure herself that
the litigation was being conducted in accordance with the government's
stated commitment to promoting the equality of disadvantaged groups.
She accepted that challenge, and undertook to make the review. The
resolution that was put forward at the symposium on this issue also
called upon the Minister of Justice to seek similar commitments from
her provincial colleagues. We await results.
Equality-seeking groups involved in litigation have generally
found governments unresponsive when their legislation, policies, and
practices are challenged in court. Predictably, governments are
4 The federal government programme for funding equality rights litigation, the Court
Challenges Program, has now been cancelled. This programme had been heavily relied upon for
litigation by equality-seeking groups raising challenges involving federal programmes. Ironically,
one of the stated justifications for the cancellation of the programme was that it promoted
adversarial rather than co-operative approaches to addressing equality issues.
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somewhat more responsive when such groups are on the same side of a
case. This is happening with more and more frequency as the shape of
Charter litigation develops and changes in this country.
Equality rights occupy a different historical and jurisprudential
place in the Canadian legal picture than do many other types of Charter
rights, particularly those rights thought of as political rights. Early
Charter decisions discussed at some length the nature and source of
rights like freedom of expression and freedom of association. Generally,
courts accepted the view that these rights pre-existed the Charter in
Canadian law, being fundamental to a free and democratic society.
Whether these are seen as "rights" or as "freedoms," courts, at the level
of conceptualization, preferred to deal with them as "freedoms," and
saw their role as ensuring that governmental action infringed on these
freedoms only within those reasonable limits justifiable pursuant to
section 1.
According to equality-seeking groups, equality rights fall into a
different conceptual category. Equality rights as well as political rights
are recognized in the Charter. It is clear on almost any definition of
equality, however, that equality does not exist in Canadian society. It is
a goal to strive for, and not an existing state to be preserved. While
some rights may legitimately be seen as best protected by an absence of
government regulation, the promotion of equality requires governments
to take positive action to bring about social change. If disadvantaged
groups are to achieve substantive equality in our society, they will
require aggressive assistance from governmental action, by way of both
positive law and social programmes.
If we look at equality rights from this perspective, it ceases to be
surprising that Charter challenge to legislation so frequently comes from
the socially advantaged, or that equality-seeking litigation groups like
LAF are so often on the side of governments in defending legislation
designed to benefit disadvantaged groups. As an instrument to promote
equality for the disadvantaged, section 15 is getting a far more vigorous
workout as a shield than as a sword.
If disadvantaged groups must look to government both to
implement programmes to promote and realize Charter equality values,
and then to defend those programmes in the courts from challenges
based on notions of formal equality, amongst other attacks, there is a
very high premium on proper legislative drafting, on proper creation of
legislative history leaving no room for doubt about legislative intent to
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promote equality, and ultimately, on proper litigation strategies to
defend legislation against attack. Part of the responsibility of
government in responding to the needs and interests of the
disadvantaged will be to legislate to promote equality in ways that will
withstand Charter attack.
Much of the government's work in this area will revolve around a
sensitive, policy-oriented approach to section 1 of the Charter. The
Supreme Court has now developed two interpretative themes in its
approach to the role played by section 1 that are important to this
discussion. First, the Court has said that it will take a different and more
flexible approach to the balancing of rights and interests under section 1
where interests other than solely those of the state are being protected
and promoted by the legislation under attack. In particular, it will allow
the legislature more scope to balance the claims of competing groups
where the rights of vulnerable groups are at stake.5
Second, the Court has said that legislation designed to promote
and enhance equality rights is entitled to special protection under
section 1. Specifically, the Court has said that "in light of the Charter
commitment to equality, and the reflection of this commitment in the
framework of section 1, the objective of the impugned legislation is
enhanced insofar as it seeks to ensure the equality of all individuals in
Canadian society." 6
Both these jurisprudential trends, if they can be called that, show
some promise that the Court will foster, perhaps even mandate, a
positive role for legislatures in the promotion of equality rights.
Certainly this approach to section 1 resonates with a judicial deference
that is entirely absent from discussions of the role of positive law in areas
where the proper role of government is more often seen as one of non-
intervention. But if that promise is to be realized in ways meaningful to
disadvantaged groups in Canada, government must take up the
challenge to legislate energetically to promote equality rights, at the
same time as it lays careful constitutional foundations for the defence of
this legislation.
In the area of equality rights, governments that claim a
commitment to promoting the equality of disadvantaged groups should
5 Attomey-General of Quebec v. Irwin Toy Ltd., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927 at 990 [hereinafter Irwin
Toy].
6 Keegstra, supra note 2 at 756.
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be reflecting not on the constraints of the Charter for public policy, but
on the positive mandate provided by the Charter for governmental
initiatives to reduce inequalities in Canadian society, and to use law to
provide equal benefit and protection of all law, including all Charter
protected rights and freedoms. Governments should also reflect on the
fact that equality-seeking groups will be looking to government not just
to deliver equality, but to deliver equality in constitutionally defensible
ways, drawing on the wisdom of cases like Keegstra and Irwin Toy to
buttress equality legislation with purpose and intent evidence that can
claim constitutionally enhanced section 1 protection.
It is my view that to date governmental response to Charter
litigation brought on behalf of equality-seeking groups reflects a very
deeply entrenched resistance to important Charter values. We are told
that governments, both in their political and in their bureaucratic
manifestations, have accepted that the Charter is here to stay as a
constraint on governmental action. This may be the case. But this
acceptance appears to be premised on a vision of the Charter as simply
an instrument governing relations between governments and courts.
Governments see the Charter as compelling them to share power with
the courts, but not to share power with the people. In particular, they do
not see equality-seeking groups who use litigation as a tool as part of a
Charter-inspired democratic process. Charter litigators are treated as
aliens to the democratic process, using illegitimate tactics to wrest more
than their fair share from the body politic for the interest groups that
they represent.
This attitude must change if the Charter is to become real to the
people to whom it was given. Just as the Charter is fundamentally
different from other laws, Charter litigation is fundamentally different
from other kinds of litigation. It requires a different, more humane,
more thoughtful, and altogether less adversarial kind of response from
government. I am hopeful that opportunities of the sort provided by this
conference for representatives of government and public interest groups
to discuss these issues will be more plentiful than they have been, and
that through these kinds of discussions more fruitful and positive
approaches to Charter litigation may be found.
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